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More than “Mere Ideas”: Deweyan Tools for the 
Contemporary Philosopher
Barbara S. Stengel
It looks as if you had more faith in my ideas than I have 
myself—but I honestly believe that they are methods of 
action and not mere ideas. . . . I don’t see myself as the 
one to take the lead in putting them into action. … In 
the main the younger generation has got to do it, and 
meantime it is a practical matter as far as it goes to get 
more persons more used to the idea of the tools—tho 
of course they won’t be really tools till they are really 
used.
—John Dewey1
John Dewey was born into a world ripe for philosophical reconstruction, as sci-
entifi c advancement, technological innovation, and social reinterpretation recon-
fi gured the intellectual landscape. Dewey rendered his world intelligible through 
three important “moral ideas”2:
Th e voice and the perspective of “the other” is an essential source for 1. 
understanding. 
Th e practice of intelligence requires a logic of continuity.2. 
What 3. is matters in the construction of what can and ought to be. 
Th ese moving ideas, these tools, are familiar to contemporary scholars—critical 
theorists, feminists, and scientists respectively—who claim them as their own while 
any link to Dewey is obscured or ignored. Here I explore Dewey’s early recogni-
tion of these tools. I suggest that Dewey speaks in a voice we can still hear today 
precisely because these seemingly new ideas were embedded in his philosophical, 
pedagogical, and relational habits of mind. However, I do so—and conclude—with 
the caution that “doing Dewey” requires a dynamic rather than static approach to 
philosophic ideas as heuristic habits are always subject to reconstruction. I begin 
with some relevant observations about Dewey’s biography.
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Biographical Notes
It is well known that John Dewey was born the same year that Charles Darwin pub-
lished On the Origin of Species. As commentators mark Darwin’s achievement in 
theorizing natural selection, most note the ways in which Darwin was “ahead of his 
time.” He was able to imagine natural selection as the means of evolution ahead of 
the evidence for its existence—ahead even of the mechanisms (for example, Men-
delian genetics, DNA) that would explain it—and to imagine (and swallow) the 
implications of natural selection for the status of humans in the world.
Dewey too, was ahead of his time, in part because this world of science framed 
his thinking. While the Darwin synchronicity and infl uence is clear, it is less well 
known that Dewey knew Albert Einstein; that his daughter Jane was an MIT-trained 
physicist in the fi eld of quantum physics; or that Dewey corresponded with Scud-
der Klyce who sent him treatises on quantum theory. Uncertainty and relativity, 
features of the cutting edge physical science of his time, also challenged Dewey’s 
thinking about thinking.
Dewey’s attraction to the evolution of species and processes of natural selec-
tion runs parallel to his interest in the Hegelian evolution of ideas. But remember 
that Dewey—who wrote his doctoral dissertation on Kant—turned to Hegel rather 
than Kant because “the road to empiricism is much easier from Hegel than it is from 
the bog of Kant.”3 Th is road to empiricism was Dewey’s path. In his own words, 
Dewey “jumped thru Hegel . . . not just out of him. I took some of the hoop (con-
tinuity, anti-hard and fast separations) with me. . . . [H]e saved me from the Kan-
tian bug which was all the vogue—and . . . headed [me] away from subject-object, 
individual-social, mind-matter etc isolates.”4
A signifi cant transition occurs in Dewey’s philosophy in the decade between 
1886 and 1896. Th e clear signal that Dewey’s thinking had changed irrevocably ap-
pears in “Th e Refl ex Arc Concept in Psychology” (1896), where organic circuit rather 
than dualistic sequence becomes Dewey’s solution to virtually every philosophic 
puzzle. Dewey recognizes the transition and speculates as to the causes:
I should fi nd it rather diffi  cult to give any very defi nite account of my 
change from the philosophical standpoint. I may, however, mention three 
things which are quite infl uential. In the fi rst place I was much struck in 
the “Psychology” of Professor James [that] the biological conception . . . 
was perhaps the fundamental thing. Secondly, I became more and more 
preoccupied with the problem of the adaptation of the logic of K[a]nt and 
H[e]gel to the conditions of actual scientifi c inquiry and formulation. In 
the third place, in the early nineties it was my lot to teach ethics and be-
come especially interested in the problem of the relation of refl ection and 
reason to conduct. I became convinced of the unsatisfactoriness of the cur-
rent ethics, both empirical and rationalistic, and so attempted to develop a 
theory of a more organic connection between thought and action. Finally 
these [th]ree lines of interest came together.5
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Th us Dewey identifi es the themes that will mark more than fi ve decades of 
philosophizing and explains their origin. Dewey was always careful, as he acknowl-
edges in Experience and Nature, to embed his arguments in the philosophical con-
versation to which he understood himself to be contributing, but that conversation 
was oft en not the source of or the impetus for his thinking.
Science and philosophy were not more important sources of Dewey’s think-
ing than were people. His biography reveals a willingness to engage a wide range 
of people and a wide world of cultures and this too helped frame his thought in 
a way that seems contemporary.  Consider Dewey’s travels to Japan, to China, to 
Russia. He didn’t go to speak. He went to live.  For several years around 1920 and 
for periods of several months at other times, Dewey (with and without his various 
family members) lived outside the United States.
In Chicago and New York, Dewey was extraordinarily responsive to almost 
anyone who reached out to him. He had substantive professional relationships with 
women, he interacted with a series of “odd ducks,” and he worked with and for the 
well being of those socially dispossessed. His interactions closer to home suggest 
a willingness to pay careful attention to the thinking of those who might be dis-
missed as unsophisticated.
And of course, Dewey thought with and learned from scholars outside the 
bounds of philosophy because he found the territory that had been staked out for 
philosophy unfertile. Psychologist William James was a provocateur for Dewey 
even when they disagreed. Sociologists George Herbert Mead and Arthur Bentley 
off ered Dewey more than provocation; their own theories and concepts (Mead on 
the social and behavioral nature of the self and Bentley on experience as transac-
tion) fi gure prominently in Dewey’s best known work.
Each of these aspects of Dewey’s biography corresponds with one of the ideas 
articulated at the outset. I begin here with Dewey’s ability to listen to the other, to 
take seriously ideas and observations and responses that issue from standpoints 
diff erent from Dewey’s own. In a philosophy of ideas, this would be unthinkable. 
In a philosophy of living, this was central.
Listening to the Other
[Open-mindedness is] an attitude of mind which actively 
welcomes suggestions and relevant information from all 
sides . . . .6
Good teachers are people who are both interesting and interested. I don’t know if 
Dewey was interesting, though the steady stream of students, correspondents, and 
others who sought his attention suggest that he was.  But it is clear that Dewey was 
interested in all facets of human action and in any intelligent explanation of that 
action, no matter what the source. As his biography amply illustrates, John Dewey 
listened not just to philosophers but also to “the other,” to persons who did not 
share his academic, political, and economic status. Dewey biographer Jay Martin 
E&C   Education and Culture
92    Barbara S. Stengel
puts it this way: “It was and remained a characteristic of Dewey that he was always 
receptive to alternative ideas. With professional philosophers, he generally held to 
his own positions, but with intelligent women, non-philosophers, odd thinkers, and 
ordinary folk, he was a student again.”7
Dewey’s associations with “odd thinkers” 8 have been documented and ques-
tioned, sometimes respectfully and sometimes not. Recently, some of Dewey’s odd 
associations have come to make more sense as the value of Dewey’s conception of 
philosophy becomes clearer. Consider, for example, Dewey’s association with Frank-
lin Ford and the ill-fated “Th ought News” experiment. In the age of blogs and social 
networking, of Th e Daily Show and Th e Colbert Report, it seems that Dewey and 
Ford may have been on to something.
When Dewey originally consulted F. Matthias Alexander for some physical 
aches and pains around 1916, he may not have understood how Alexander’s approach 
to healing mind and body as one would fi nd expression in his own thinking.  But it 
did. Alexander, dismissed by many as a folk healer, knew something in practice that 
we are just today coming to accept widely. Dewey knew it too, but only in theory 
until Alexander’s system provided the instantiation he needed. 
Albert Barnes was an eccentric who both led Dewey down a garden path (Th e 
Polish Study) and shepherded him toward signifi cant work (Art as Experience). In 
a 1932 letter, Dewey says, “I loved your piece on vision & form—You ought to pub-
lish it, then I could borrow instead of stealing.”9  And in a self-deprecating letter 
to his children, Dewey says of Barnes, he “is a man from whom one can learn a lot 
but apparently only the opposite kind of a crank like myself is capable of learning 
from him.”10
Scudder Klyce, who wrote Dewey lengthy tomes for more than 15 years, was 
even odder than Barnes. While most of Dewey’s friends disapproved of this corre-
spondent, it seems that Dewey listened to him with some profi t. Dewey acknowl-
edges Klyce as having infl uenced his logic. And more than a decade later, Dewey 
says about Klyce: “In my opinion, however, he really did have something, and 
these non-professionals who have originality have a sort of unfortunate attraction 
for me, not wholly unfortunate because, aft er all, I have learned a good deal from 
some of them.”11
If Dewey was attracted to interesting “non-professionals” like Klyce, he was 
doubly indebted to a long list of “intelligent women” who enacted his ideas even 
before he could formulate them. His wife of 41 years, Alice, who with the Camp sis-
ters inspired his pedagogical theory through their own action, leads the list. Dewey 
wrote Schools of Tomorrow with daughter Evelyn, and entrusted his biography to his 
daughter Jane. Whatever Dewey’s relationship with Anzia Yezierska, it appears that 
knowing her altered Dewey’s perspective in ways that privileged the aesthetic. 
A place of honor on the list of infl uential women would have to go to Jane 
Addams who exhibited “the most magnifi cent exhibition of intellectual & moral faith 
[Dewey] ever saw,”12 who forced Dewey to rethink his own views about democratic 
dialogue and Hegelian dialectic, and who showed him what democracy as “a mode 
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of associated living” looked like. Female graduate students and colleague educators 
were drawn to Dewey and he accepted them readily, again acknowledging the value 
of their insights. Of Ella Flagg Young, for example, Dewey says, “I was constantly 
getting ideas from her. . . . [I]t was from her that I learned that freedom and respect 
for freedom mean regard for the inquiring or refl ective processes of individuals, 
and that what ordinarily passes for freedom--freedom from external restraint, 
spontaneity in expression, etc.—are of signifi cance only in their connection with 
thinking operations.”13 Dewey confesses that he “had never appreciated this aspect 
of [his] own logical theory till [he] found it so emphasized by her” in her practice as 
an educator. Young and other women spoke to him in action and in word.
Th at Dewey lent his time, energy, pen, and name to the achievement of social 
justice for “ordinary folk” is well known. Dewey met with and advocated for the 
Workers Defense League and for various labor unions. He worked with people of 
color in the founding of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People. He supported immigrants’ rights and opportunities. Th at his thinking about 
democratic theory and social interaction might be altered as a result of his interac-
tion with these “others” rarely comes up. But it should, as one example suggests.
Dewey spent signifi cant time talking with immigrants at Hull House in Chi-
cago and later as part of the Polish Study in the Port Richmond section of Phila-
delphia. When asked about the results of Polish immigrants’ adjustment, Dewey 
bemoans the typical American attitude toward immigrants, “Th e complacency 
consists in regarding the immigrants as constituting the problem and American-
ization simply as a problem of assimilating them. Going by what we learned as a 
sample, the following problem is almost wholly one of reforming the environment 
of America into which the foreigners come.”14 Dewey could come to this conclu-
sion because he heard these and other immigrants describe their own experience 
as participants in an American social life that did not enact democratic dialogue 
across diff erence.
In Democracy and Education, Dewey wrote of open-mindedness as one of 
four intellectual virtues (or as he put it “traits of individual method”). Along with 
directness, single-mindedness, and responsibility, open-mindedness was a habit that 
marked defensible thought. Dewey lived open-mindedness with near-perfect pitch.
But near-perfect is not perfect and Dewey was not without blind spots.  While 
in China, for instance, Dewey seemed not to notice the oft en oppressive circum-
stances under which women lived; but Alice Dewey did notice and said so.15 And 
Dewey, on occasion, employed and tolerated off ensive language.16  Nonetheless, one 
can understand why Albert Barnes might say, “Dewey has the most open mind I 
have ever seen.”17 
Given Dewey’s openness to human beings of all kinds in all kinds of places, 
it is not at all surprising when, later in life, Dewey agrees with Max Otto’s view that 
one important aim of philosophy is “cooperation with ordinary working people to 
achieve a philosophy of life.”18 As we see below, that philosophy employed a logic 
of continuity.
E&C   Education and Culture
94    Barbara S. Stengel
Continuity: Clearing the Path to Both/And
[Professional philosophers] . . . understand [my work] to 
be a series of criticisms . . . of infl uential dualisms which 
have found articulate expression in infl uential historical 
[p]hilosophies and which have made their way into 
common ways of thinking with a very bad eff ect. And 
the principle on which the criticisms are made is that of 
introducing the principle of continuity in a way which 
reveals the source of the dualism and eliminates it.19
Captured in a letter cited in earlier biographical notes is Dewey’s clear acknowl-
edgement of his changing mindset before and aft er Th e Refl ex Arc essay. Dewey 
moved away from the accepted—and epistemologically dominant—philosophical 
standpoint between 1886 and 1896, and in the process moved away from a par-
ticular and limited view of philosophy as a professional activity. Th e principle of 
continuity, employed critically, carved out the path through traditional philosophic 
underbrush.
In 1893, for example, Dewey took on “Th e Superstition of Necessity”: “Ne-
cessity is a device by which we both conceal from ourselves the unreal character 
of what we have called real, and also get rid of the practical evil consequences of 
hypostatizing a fragment into an independent whole.”20 Dewey recognized that hal-
lowed philosophical tools are hypostatizations. He not only uses the principle of 
continuity to reject the standard logical understanding of necessity, but turns it on 
its head to privilege the practical over the logical:  “. . . logical necessity rests upon 
teleological–that, indeed, it is the teleological read backwards. Th e logical process of 
discovering and stating the reality of some event simply reverses the process which 
the mind goes through in setting up and realizing an end.”21
He analyzes cause and eff ect and means and ends similarly with respect to 
necessity and fi nds the same dichotomizing fault, and then reconstructs the philo-
sophical standpoint in a way that holds distinctive and even dichotomous termi-
nological tools in constructive and mutually defi ning tension by linking them to 
the exercise of judgment in action.
“[T]he idea of necessity marks a certain stage in the development of judg-
ment; . . . it refers to a residuum, in our judgments and thus in our objects, 
of indeterminateness or vagueness, which it replaces without wholly negat-
ing; that it is thus relative to “chance” or contingency; that its value con-
sists wholly in the impulse given judgment towards the is, or the concrete 
reality defi ned throughout.22
And it is this starting point in the exercise of judgment in action with re-
spect to what is that requires Dewey to reject the epistemological constraints of 
the logic of either/or in favor of a logic of continuity. Th is logic is neither monis-
tic nor dualistic but pluralistic. For Dewey, either/or conceptualizations create 
problems where none exist. Worse, they stop thinking. Th e logic of both/and is 
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generative and prompts novel, intelligent reinterpretation of and response to the 
challenges of human living.  
While many commentators see Dewey’s dissolution of dichotomies as a re-
sult of his Hegelianism, I suggest this should also be linked to his naturalistic (and 
science-inspired) methodology discussed below as well to his willingness to listen 
to intelligent women and others discussed above. Dewey himself identifi ed three 
factors responsible for his change in his logic: the infl uence of William James on 
the subject of mind and body, the eff ort to naturalize Hegelian logic, and the expe-
rience of teaching ethics binding him as it does to practical reason. Each of these 
infl uences deserves further mention.
William James turned Dewey’s attention to psychology but it was to psychol-
ogy in a decidedly new key. In his Principles of Psychology, in his Talks to Teachers, 
and especially in his writings on the nature of emotion, James turned the spotlight 
to the body as a feeling, thinking organism, calling into question any theory of 
human living that separates mind and body. By the time Experience and Nature is 
published in 1925, Dewey’s view of the so-called “mind-body problem” is sharpened. 
“Th e isolation of nature and experience from each other has rendered the undeni-
able connection of thought and eff ectiveness of knowledge and purposive action, 
with the body, an insoluble mystery. Restoration of continuity is shown to do away 
with the mind-body problem.”23 Th e contemporary theorizing of neuroscientists 
like Antonio Damasio and philosophers like Richard Shusterman echoes Dewey’s 
early understanding.
Th e Hegelian logic of thesis-antithesis-synthesis provides Dewey with a frame 
in which to construct a both/and thought process, but recall that Dewey “jumped 
through Hegel” while getting away from “subject-object, individual-social, mind-
matter etc isolates.” From Dewey’s point of view, Hegel’s method, “actually made 
a complete break with the logical tradition,” enabling Dewey to translate earlier 
Hegelianism into social or cultural psychology—“[t]hereby getting rid I hope of 
what [Hegel] calls ‘the load of terrible heavy European classic idealism.’”24
Nearly a decade of teaching courses related to ethics and morality prevented 
Dewey from relying on any theory that separated thought from action and indi-
vidual from society except for purposes of analysis.  As he studied the “relation of 
refl ection and reason to conduct,” Dewey found fault with both empiricist and ra-
tionalist ethical theories for their lack of continuity between thought and action. He 
found fault as well with the cultural and social psychology of moral theorizing. A 
psychology that assumes that individuals imagine and then implement ideal forms 
of political and social organization was, for Dewey, dangerously incomplete if not 
utterly misguided. Changes in interaction among individuals already formed by 
and through socially constructed habits result in new forms of active organizational 
practices.Th ere is no question that Dewey’s reconstruction of philosophy was widely 
misunderstood and, sometimes as a result, widely disputed.  Even when appreciated, 
many philosophers did not understand the extent to which Dewey had shift ed his 
point of view.  At a 1940 dinner, William Pepperell Montague introduced Dewey 
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by noting his intent “to practicalize intelligence.” “Dewey replied quietly but fi rmly 
that Montague was taking a narrow, inbred view—a philosopher’s trade-union view, 
he implied—of what he, Dewey had tried to accomplish. His eff ort had not been to 
practicalize intelligence but to intellectualize practice.”25
Th e notion of “intellectualizing practice” resonates with contemporary femi-
nist theory. As Charlene Haddock Seigfried points out, pragmatism “was criticized 
and eventually relegated to the margins for holding the very positions that today 
feminists would fi nd to be its greatest strengths.”26 By emphasizing continuity as 
a naturalistic methodological principle, Dewey avoids monism and dualism and 
makes way for shift ing and situated epistemic standpoints. I turn now to this natu-
ralism.
Dewey’s Empirical Naturalism
I believe that the method of empirical naturalism . . . 
provides . . . the way by which we can be genuinely 
naturalistic and yet maintain cherished values, provided 
they are critically clarifi ed and reinforced. Th e naturalistic 
method . . . destroys many things once cherished; but it 
destroys them by revealing their inconsistency with the 
nature of things.27 
In these introductory remarks to the 1929 revised version of Experience and Nature, 
Dewey states his view of philosophy as empirical (that is, methodological) natural-
ism. Th e point of a naturalistic stance is to uncover, but also to create, the “is” in 
the process of creating new ideals and values. Dewey’s view is not scientism but an 
eff ort to take the results of scientifi c inquiry seriously while acknowledging what 
science does not do and cannot do with respect to the value of living.
Dewey, as a man of his own time and of ours, does want to take science se-
riously. Th is is the man whose thought takes shape in the shadow of Darwin and 
Einstein, and he knows it.  Later in Experience and Nature Dewey says:
[N]atural sciences not only draw their material from primary experience, 
but they refer it back again for test. Darwin began with the pigeons, cattle 
and plants of breeders and gardeners. Some of the conclusions he reached 
were so contrary to accepted beliefs that they were condemned as absurd, 
contrary to common sense, etc. But scientifi c men, whether they accepted 
his theories or not, employed his hypotheses as directive ideas for making 
new observations and experiments among the things of raw experience. . . .  
An Einstein working by highly elaborate methods of refl ection, calculates 
theoretically certain results in the defl ection of light by the presence of the 
sun. A technically equipped expedition is sent to South Africa so that by 
means of experiencing a thing—an eclipse—in crude, primary, experience, 
observations can be secured to compare with, and test the theory implied 
in, the calculated result.28
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Th e shadow cast by Darwin and Einstein is two-fold. Dewey’s thinking is 
shaped by the substance of their insights: the evolutionary temper in Darwin and 
the challenge to fi xed certainty in Einstein. But, as is evident above, he is even more 
aff ected by a critical feature of the scientists’ methodology that he fi nds sorely lack-
ing in philosophy. Th is is the habit of checking back with nature. Subjecting nature-
as-experienced to systematic refl ection has always been a prompt for both science 
and philosophy but only science, in Dewey’s view, completes the circuit. Dewey’s 
methodological naturalism is a plea for philosophers to complete the refl ective cir-
cuit and to check their own insights back against the quality (that is the meaning 
and value) of lived experience.
In Experience and Nature, Dewey addresses the objection that naturalism is 
tantamount to a materialism that deprives experience of ideal signifi cance:
If experience actually presents esthetic and moral traits, then these traits 
may also be supposed to reach down into nature, and to testify to something 
that belongs to nature as truly as does the mechanical structure attributed 
to it in physical science. To rule out that possibility by some general reason-
ing is to forget that the very meaning and purport of empirical method is 
that things are to be studied on their own account, so as to fi nd out what 
is revealed when they are experienced.29
While Dewey recognizes Moore’s naturalistic fallacy, Hume’s is-ought prob-
lem, and James's psychologist’s fallacy, his response is to view all three problems as 
a failure to maintain a thorough-going naturalistic method. Th at is, such fallacies 
stem from the tendency to take what is in the context of some particular experience 
as frozen for all experience. It is an error of reifi cation, a failure to understand the 
dynamic nature of concepts and facts. As early as 1891, Dewey reveals the impetus 
behind his empirical naturalism: “the usual idea of the Good seems to be an abstrac-
tion which has been frozen. [Th e original idea] denotes full activity, but then it [is] 
abstracted and put over by itself and then frozen in its isolated [form] apart from 
the content of specifi c activities which fi rst gave it meaning.”30 Dewey seeks to avoid 
premature “frozenness” and unacknowledged selection of concepts and ideas that 
in turn limits responsive action. He argues for an “[h]onest empirical method [that] 
will state when and where and why the act of selection took place, and thus enable 
others to repeat it and test its worth.”31 Th e best way to do that is to follow the lead 
of the sciences in beginning from and checking back to lived experience, enabling 
replication of assertions in the lived experience of others. Th is is not scientism. 
Dewey is simply acknowledging both scientifi c advances and scientifi c limits.
Whereas “the offi  ce of physical science is to discover those properties and re-
lations of things in virtue of which they are capable of being used as instrumentali-
ties,” philosophy refl ects on “the intrinsic nature of events [as] revealed in experience 
as the immediately felt qualities of things . . . to coordinate these qualities with the 
regularities revealed by science.” Th e goal of philosophy is “intelligently directed 
experience, as distinct from mere casual and uncritical experience.”32
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Experience is the means, the only means, of penetrating continually further 
into the heart of nature. . . . It is not experience which is experienced, but 
nature—stones, plants, animals, diseases, health, temperature, electricity, 
and so on. Th ings interacting in certain ways are experience; they are what 
is experienced. Linked in certain other ways with another natural object—
the human organism—they are how things are experienced as well.33
Dewey was deeply committed to the idea that what is matters in the construc-
tion of what can—and ought to—be, and conversely, that our construction of what 
can and ought to be is implicated in what is. His naturalism was a tool to support 
his conception of philosophy as “a generalized theory of criticism.”
Th ere is a special service which the study of philosophy may render. Empiri-
cally pursued it will not be a study of philosophy but a study, by means of 
philosophy, of life-experience. But this experience is already overlaid and 
saturated with the products of the refl ection of past generations and by-gone 
ages. It is fi lled with interpretations, classifi cations, due to sophisticated 
thought, which have become incorporated into what seems to be fresh na-
ïve empirical material. . . . If we may for the moment call these materials 
prejudices . . . then philosophy is a critique of prejudices.34
Th is is a view that feminists, postmodernists and critical theorists might fi nd 
congenial—and useful—whatever Dewey’s own prejudices left  unexamined.
“Doing Dewey” Dynamically
I appreciate what you say about the dangers of a 
philosophy which calls for dynamic application itself 
remaining static.35
Th ree of Dewey’s central ideas—the value of the voice of the other, the principle of 
continuity as ground for the practice of intelligence, and the critical power of em-
pirical naturalism—have become tools in the hands of this “younger generation” 
of scholars. We are today “more used to the idea of the tools” that marked Dewey’s 
thought and social action. Th is is, I think, why Dewey can sound right, and oft en 
remarkably timely, particularly in his assessment of concrete social and educational 
issues. It is also why scholars, educators, and social critics who would look ahead 
rather than back may nonetheless want to linger a while with Dewey.
But lingering with Dewey does not mean guarding his words as truth. Dewey, 
perhaps more than anyone, knew that when he said: “I make mistakes of course, and 
I’m deeply aware of my lack of art in writing. But in the main I think I’m headed 
right and it will all come out in the wash that needs to.”36 Dewey trusted that his 
ideas would stand up to test in experience that he himself viewed as the criterion 
of philosophy. It was then and is now the ideas as tools, not the man, that ought to 
be the focus of attention. When Myles Horton acknowledged his indebtedness to 
Dewey but denied that he was a disciple,37 Dewey wrote back with a rejoinder that 
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remains true today, “I’m so delighted to fi nd that you don’t claim to be a disciple. 
My enemies are bad enough, but my disciples are worse.”38
Lingering with Dewey means approaching the world and the issues of liv-
ing anew. And that means challenging Dewey’s words, his blind spots, even ulti-
mately, his standpoint. It may mean “jumping through” Dewey, taking only some 
residue with us.
Recall that the three Deweyan ideas explored here are moral ideas, ideas that 
move us. Th ey move scholars today not because they are Dewey’s but because they 
are good ideas. If and when they no longer move us, they will be abandoned, re-
placed with other tools, other ideas, that prove their worth in lived experience. For 
now, open-mindedness, intellectualized practice and methodological naturalism 
are, for contemporary philosophers, more than “mere ideas.” Th ey are, as Dewey 
hoped, “methods of action.”
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